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Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Coy v. Iowa,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
one-way mirror placed between the thirteen-year-old victims of an
alleged sexual assault and the defendant during the victims' testi-
mony at trial violated the defendant's sixth amendment 2 right to
confront the witnesses against him.3 In the Supreme Court of Iowa,
defendant Coy had challenged his sexual assault conviction on the
grounds that the placing of the one-way mirror, in accordance with
an Iowa statute,4 between himself and the children testifying at his
trial violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him and his constitutional right to due process. 5 The
Supreme Court of Iowa held that the defendant's rights were not
violated by the screen. 6 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, Coy again argued that his constitutional rights were violated.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court
1 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
2 The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799, 2802.
4 The relevant Iowa provision provides in pertinent part:
The court may require a party be confined [sic] to an adjacent room or behind a
screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's
testimony, but does not allow the child to see or hear the party. However, if a party
is so confined, the court shall take measures to insure that the party and counsel can
confer during the testimony and shall inform the child that the party can see and
hear the child during the testimony.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1987).
5 State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 730-31 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).




This Note argues that the Supreme Court was correct in decid-
ing that in this case the defendant's rights were violated. However,
this Note, in agreement with the concurring opinion, endorses a
narrow interpretation of Coy. Although the sixth amendment con-
frontation rights include the right to the face-to-face meeting denied
in this case, this right is not absolute and is subject to exceptions.
Moreover, while the use of protective devices like the screen at issue
in Coy is justifiable as a public policy exception to the right to con-
frontation, a court should require a case-specific showing of neces-
sity before permitting the use of these devices. Since there was no
such showing in Coy to justify the infringement of the defendant's
confrontation right, the violation of this right was unconstitutional.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The defendant, John Avery Coy, lived with his girlfriend in a
residential neighborhood next door to one of the victims. 8 On the
afternoon of August 2, 1985, Coy, sitting in a lawn chair in his back
yard, watched as C.B., one of the thirteen-year-old victims, con-
structed a makeshift tent in her back yard in preparation for a camp
out.9 The tent was not visible from the street, but was visible from
Coy's home.' 0 C.B. and her friend, thirteen-year-old N.C., went to
sleep in the tent at about 10:00 or 11:00 p.m.11 During the night, a
man crawled into the tent, grabbed the girls by the throat and
threatened them, warning them not to scream. 12 The man ordered
the girls to take off all their clothes except their underwear.' 3 He
fondled their breasts and vaginal areas and took off their underwear,
which he placed in a white bag he had brought with him.' 4 After
removing his own clothing, he ordered the girls to perform oral sex
on him and then to kiss each other.' 5 They obeyed.' 6 He also uri-
nated into one of the cups which the girls had brought out to the
tent with them. 17 Before leaving, the man warned the girls not to
tell anyone what had happened, and tied the girls with their
7 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.







15 Id. at 4.
16 Id.
17 Id.
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sweatpants. 1 8
After the girls untied themselves, they went into the house to
report the incident to C.B.'s parents, who called the police and took
the girls to the hospital for an examination.19 C.B.'s father told the
police that he suspected Coy, and Coy was arrested on an unrelated
charge.20 The girls could not identify their attacker because at the
time of the assault he appeared to be wearing a nylon stocking over
his head, and he shined a flashlight in their eyes. 2 1 The girls' flash-
light with Coy's fingerprints was found in Coy's garage and the cup
into which the attacker urinated was found in the garbage just inside
Coy's back door.22
At the beginning of Coy's trial, the State of Iowa made a motion
to allow the victims to testify either via closed-circuit television or
behind a screen. 23 A recently enacted Iowa statute approved the use
of such devices.24 Coy objected to the use of the screen, arguing
that the girls could not identify him as their attacker, and that the
screen violated his sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him. 25 He also contended that the screen created an infer-
ence of guilt, thereby violating his fourteenth amendment right to a
fair trial.26
The court rejected the state's request to employ closed-circuit
18 Id. The man stated that if the girls "told anyone what had happened, they would
go through a lot." Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. The father suspected Coy because "only Coy had a vantage point to see the
tent." Id. When arrested, Coy was wearing a wrist watch, pushed midway up his arm,
with the face of the watch turned inward. Id. The girls testified that the intruder was
wearing a watch midway up his arm, with the face turned inward. Id. at 5.
21 Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2806 n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22 Brief for Appellee at 5. Coy testified that on the morning following the assault he
found the flashlight and cup discarded at the corner of his driveway and took them in-
side. Brief for Appellant at 8, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)(No. 86-6757). In
addition, the girls stated that immediately after their attacker left the tent, they heard a
nearby motorcycle start up and drive away. The defendant did not own a motorcycle,
nor had he operated one in the area. During the search of the defendant's residence,
the police did not find a mask or clothing that matched the description given by the girls,
nor did they find the girls' panties. Id.
23 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799.
24 Id. See supra note 4 for the text of the Iowa statute.
25 Brief for Appellant at 3-4. See supra note 2 for the text of the sixth amendment.
Defense counsel's argument that the girls could not identify their assailant implied that
testifying in the defendant's presence would not be traumatic for the girls. Brief for
Appellant at 4 n.6. The State countered that even if the girls could not identify their
attacker, they would be traumatized by the presence of the defendant because they as-
sumed he was guilty from the fact that he was charged. Id.
26 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part,
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV § 1.
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television but permitted a screen to be used only during the girls'
testimony.27 During the girls' testimony, the lighting in the court-
room was dimmed and a one-way mirror was set up in front of the
table where Coy sat.2 8 The mirror allowed the defendant to hear
and dimly see the witnesses, but the witnesses were only able to hear
the defendant. 29 In addition, the mirror allowed the rest of the
courtroom, including judge, jury, and spectators, to see and hear
both the witness and the defendant.30 The witnesses were told that
the defendant could see and hear them while they were testifying.31
The trial court twice instructed the jury that the mirror was used in
accordance with a recent Iowa statute.32 Both after the girls testified
and at the close of the state's case, Coy moved for a mistrial based
on the prejudicial impact the screening device had upon his trial. 33
These motions were overruled.34
After jury trial, Coy was convicted on two counts of engaging in
lascivious acts with a child.3 5 On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Iowa, Coy contended that the screen violated his sixth amendment
right to confront his accusers. 36 Coy argued that the trial court was
constitutionally required to find that the screen was necessary
before permitting its use.3 7 He also argued that the screen was prej-
udicial and therefore a violation of his right to a fair trial guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. 38 The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
Coy's conviction and held that a finding of necessity was not consti-
tutionally required because Coy's confrontation rights were not vio-
lated. 39 The court also held that the screen was not prejudicial and
27 Brief for Appellant at 4.
28 Brief for Appellee at 9-10.
29 Brief for Appellant at 5-6.
30 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32 Brief for Appellee at 11-12.
33 Brief for Appellant at 7.
34 Id.
35 State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 730 (Iowa 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). Coy
was convicted of violating § 709.8(1) of the Iowa code which provides:
It is unlawful for any person eighteen years of age or older to perform any of the
following acts with a child with or without the child's consent unless married to each
other, for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of either of them:
1. Fondle or touch the pubes or genitals of a child.
2. Permit or cause a child to fondle or touch the person's genitals or pubes.
Any person who violates a provision of this section shall, upon conviction, be guilty
of a class "D" felony.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.8(1) (West 1985).
36 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
37 State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 730.
38 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
39 State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 733-34. The court stated that "the issue of necessity
[Vol. 79
RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
thus the defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial.40
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Coy again ar-
gued that the use of the screen, over his objections and without a
finding that its use served an essential state interest, was a violation
of his fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial and his sixth
amendment confrontation right.41 Coy also contended that the
Iowa Supreme Court's error was not harmless and therefore re-
quired reversal. 42 The United States Supreme Court considered the
issue of whether Coy's sixth amendment right to confrontation and
Coy's fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial were violated by the
use of the screen.43
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia,44 rejected the
Iowa Supreme Court's ruling and held for the defendant Coy. 45 Jus-
tice Scalia stated that the right to face-to-face confrontation violated
in Coy is an essential element of the confrontation clause.46 Justice
Scalia added that certain rights guaranteed by the confrontation
clause, such as the right to cross-examine or to restrict the admissi-
bility of out-of-court statements, may be subjected to exceptions in
the face of "other important interests." 47 However, the majority de-
clined to comment on whether the right to face-to-face confronta-
tion is subject to exceptions and whether the interest at issue in Coy
of protecting the child witnesses was sufficient to justify an excep-
tion.48 The majority stated that even if an exception to the face-to-
face confrontation right were to be allowed, such an exception
would be permitted only after a case-specific showing that the ex-
ception was necessary. 49 The majority held that since no case-spe-
cific showing of necessity was made in Coy, the defendant's sixth
amendment right was violated. 50
arises when a witness is unavailable for trial and a party seeks to introduce some prior
statement or testimony of that witness .... Here, both girls were present at trial and
testified under oath." Id. at 734.
40 Id. at 735.
41 Brief for Appellant at 11, 31.
42 Id. at 41.
43 See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799, 2800, 2803.
44 Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Stevens and
White.
45 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
46 Id. at 2801.
47 Id. at 2802.





The opinion first stated that the defendant's sixth amendment
right was violated because the confrontation clause guarantees the
defendant face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses. 51 After
noting several historical examples of the right of confrontation, 52
the majority conceded that most judicial treatment of the confronta-
tion clause has dealt either with the admissibility of out-of-court
statements or restrictions upon the scope of cross-examination. 53
The majority pointed out that judicial treatment of the right to
cross-examination and the right to be present during testimony,
rather than the right to face-to-face confrontation, exists because
"there is at least some room for doubt (and hence litigation) as to
the extent to which the Clause includes th[e] [former] elements." 54
The majority stated that, because confrontation is defined as a face-
to-face encounter,55 the right to face-to-face confrontation is a lit-
eral requirement and hence the most essential element of the con-
frontation right.56 The other elements of the right are judicially
mandated components of the right and hence not as well established
as the right to face-to-face confrontation, which is a literal require-
ment of the amendment. 57
The majority explained that the right to face-to-face confronta-
tion serves a symbolic as well as a functional purpose. 58 Tradition-
ally, noted the Court, a face-to-face confrontation between accuser
and accused gives the appearance of fairness which satisfies the pub-
lic's feelings of what is just.5 9 The rationale behind this sentiment is
that "it is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his
face' than 'behind his back.' -60 Moreover, the Court posited, "even
if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly." 6'
51 Id. at 2800.
52 Justice Scalia referred to a quote from the Roman Governor Festus, who stated
that the accused must be allowed to meet his accusers "face to face." Id. (citing Acts
25:16). In addition, Justice Scalia stated that "[ilt has been argued that a form of the
right of confrontation" pre-dated the right to jury trial in England. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at
2800 (citing Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8J. PUB. L. 381,
384-387 (1959)).
53 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
54 Id.
55 The majority cited the Latin roots of the word "confront" to support its definition
of confrontation as a face-to-face encounter. The word, noted the majority, is derived
from the prefix "con" which means "against" or "opposed" and the noun "frons" which
means "forehead." Id.
56 Id. at 2801.
57 Id. at 2800-01.
58 Id. at 2801.
59 Id. at 2801-02.
60 Id. at 2802.
61 Id.
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In a footnote, the majority addressed the minority's discussion
of Dean Wigmore's treatment of the confrontation right.62 While
conceding Wigmore's conclusion that the confrontation right's pur-
pose was to provide for cross-examination, the majority stated that
simply because cross-examination is one purpose of the confronta-
tion right, the fulfillment of this purpose does not automatically dis-
charge the right.63 Moreover, the majority added that "Wigmore
did mention . . . that a secondary purpose of confrontation is to
produce 'a certain subjective moral effect... upon the witness.' "64
Having stated that the right to physical, face-to-face confronta-
tion is an essential element of the sixth amendment confrontation
right, the majority then turned to the question of whether this right
was violated in Coy. 65 The Court reasoned that because the screen's
sole purpose was to obstruct the witness' view of the defendant,
Coy's right to face his accusers was violated.66 Justice Scalia noted
that some elements of the confrontation right, such as the right to
cross-examine, the right to exclude out-of-court statements, and the
right to face-to-face confrontation at proceedings other than trial,
are subject to certain exceptions because they are "reasonably im-
plicit" elements of the right.67 These rights are not explicitly con-
tained in the sixth amendment, but rather are incidents of the
confrontation right, or traditional evidentiary rules covered by the
amendment.68 However, the right to face-to-face confrontation is
"the right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the Clause" and a lit-
eral requirement of the sixth amendment.69 Therefore, the Court
explained, while the implicit elements of the right, such as the right
to cross-examine, may be subject to exceptions, the right to face-to-
face confrontation is absolute, as it is the most explicit and essential
element of the confrontation right.70 The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that the mere existence of exceptions to the non-literal ele-
62 Id. at 2801-02 n.2.
63 Id. (citing 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)).
In support of this proposition, the Court noted that the right to a jury trial is similarly
not discharged merely because "the accused is justly convicted and publicly known to be
justly convicted-the purposes of the right to jury trial." Id.
64 Id. (quoting 5J. WIGMORE, supra note 63, § 1395, at 153). The majority conceded
that Wigmore also asserted "without support, that this effect 'does not arise from the
confrontation of the opponent and the witness,' but from 'the witness' presence before the
tribunal'..." Id. (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 63, § 1395, at 154)(emphasis in
original).
65 Id. at 2802.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2800-01.
69 Id. at 2802.
70 Id. at 2803.
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ments of the clause does not support the argument that exceptions
may be made to the right to face-to-face confrontation. 71
However, the Court declined to determine whether the right to
face-to-face confrontation is subject to exceptions, 72 stating that if
exceptions existed, the right would be subject to only those excep-
tions "necessary to further an important public policy."'73 The
Court went on to note that if compelling state interests existed
which necessitated exceptions infringing upon the right to face-to-
face confrontation, the prosecution had failed to establish the exist-
ence of any such interests in Coy.74 The prosecution's suggestion
that the statute permitting the screen's use created a "legislatively
imposed presumption of trauma" to a child victim compelled to tes-
tify in open court was rejected by the majority. 75 The Court stated
that "[s]ince there have been no individualized findings that these
particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here
could not be sustained by any conceivable exception." 76
Finally, the Court recognized that the trial court's violation of
Coy's confrontation right, like other confrontation clause violations,
was subject to a harmless error analysis and remanded the case to
the court below to conduct this analysis. 7 7 The Court added that
71 Id.
72 The Court stated: "[w]e leave for another day, however, the question whether any
exceptions [to the confrontation right] exist." Id. at 2803.
73 Id. The majority referred to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Coy, 108 S. Ct.
at 2803. Roberts stated that "competing interests, if 'closely examined' . . . may warrant
dispensing with confrontation at trial." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (quoting Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 294, 295 (1973))(citations omitted). In Roberts, the Court sug-
gested that the "necessities of the case" and the interests of "effective law enforcement"
are such competing interests. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64. The Court in Chambers identified
these interests as "other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Chambers, 410
U.S. at 295..
74 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
75 Id. The Court explained that the presumption underlying the Iowa statute was not
sufficient to support such a novel exception to the confrontation right as the exception
advocated by the prosecution stating that: "[e]ven as to exceptions from the normal
implications of the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to its most literal application,
something more than the type of generalized finding underlying such a statute is needed
when the exception is not 'firmly... rooted in ourjurisprudence.' " Id. (quoting Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 (1970)).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 2803. The Court cited Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), for the
principle that certain constitutional errors may be found to be "harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681). In Van
Arsdall, the Court held that "the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's oppor-
tunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to
harmless error analysis" and remanded the analysis to the lower court, as did the Court
in Coy. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. The Van Arsdall Court explained that in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967), "the Court rejected
766 [Vol. 79
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because the violation of Coy's confrontation right required that the
lower court's judgment be reversed, a discussion of the defendant's
contention that the screen violated his right to a fair trial was
unnecessary. 78
IV. CONCURRING OPINION
In her concurring opinion,79 Justice O'Connor agreed with Jus-
tice Scalia that the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront
the witnesses against him was violated by the use of the screen.80
However, although Justice Scalia declined to determine whether the
physical right to face-to-face confrontation was absolute, Justice
O'Connor departed from the majority by arguing that the right, like
other elements of the confrontation clause, is subject to excep-
tions.8' Justice O'Connor asserted that "in an appropriate case...
procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from the
trauma of courtroom testimony" may be used.8 2 The concurrence
agreed with the majority that these devices should be permitted only
after a case-specific showing of necessity, which was absent in Coy.83
Thus, while the concurring opinion did not conflict with the major-
ity's stance, it extended the majority's holding to permit the use of
protective devices when there is a case-specific showing of
necessity.8 4
After emphasizing the gravity of the problem of child abuse and
sexual assault, Justice O'Connor discussed the difficulties inherent
in the prosecution of such cases, such as the lack of witnesses be-
sides the victim and the trauma suffered by child witnesses.8 5 She
referred to other procedural devices aimed at protecting child wit-
nesses, including one-way or two-way closed circuit television,
the argument that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of their nature or the cir-
cumstances of the case, require reversal of a judgment of conviction." Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. at 681. The Court, in Van Arsdall, reasoned that the Constitution entitles the de-
fendant to a fair, but not a perfect, trial; and that certain errors may be "harmless" in
terms of their effect on the fact finding process. Id. As articulated in Van Arsdall, the
Chapman principle, which has been reaffirmed repeatedly, is that "an otherwise valid
conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the
whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id.
78 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803. Accordingly, the Court did not reach the question of
whether the screen was prejudicial. Id.
79 Justice White joined in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.
80 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 2803-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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which broadcast the child's testimony to the jury from a room in
which only the judge, counsel, technicians, and in some cases the
defendant, are present.8 6 Justice O'Connor suggested that these
devices would present no violation of the confrontation right if the
testimony is given in the presence of the defendant or if the defend-
ant can see the countenance of the witness through two-way dosed
circuit television.8 7
Justice O'Connor then indicated her agreement with Justice
Scalia on the issue of whether face-to-face confrontation is guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment,8 8 affirming that "the [Confrontation]
Clause embodies a general requirement that a witness face the de-
fendant."8 9 However, Justice O'Connor added that this require-
ment, like the other requirements of the confrontation clause, is not
absolute. 90 Even if certain protective devices are violative of the
confrontation clause, Justice O'Connor stated, they should be per-
mitted if necessary "to further an important public policy." 9' She
then stated that the protection of child witnesses was such a
policy.92
The concurrence agreed "with the Court that more than the
type of generalized legislative finding of necessity present here is
required" to allow use of a confrontation-violative procedure. 93
Thus, reversal of Coy's conviction was mandated. However Justice
O'Connor noted that "if a court makes a case-specific finding of ne-
cessity, as is required by a number of state statutes .... the Confron-
tation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of
protecting child witnesses," and the use of protective devices would
be permitted. 94
V. DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Blackmun's dissent9 5 treated two undecided issues of
the majority opinion: whether exceptions to the "literal" confronta-
tion right exist, 96 and whether the screen had a prejudicial impact
86 Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91 Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)(citations omitted).
95 ChiefJustice Rehnquist joined in Justice Blackmun's dissent.
96 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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upon Coy's fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial. 97 Justice
Blackmun concluded that: the confrontation right does not man-
date, but merely manifests " 'a preference for face-to-face confron-
tation at trial;' "98 the "preference" for face-to-face confrontation is
subject to exceptions involving essential state interests;99 the pro-
tection of child witnesses qualifies as such a state interest;100 a spe-
cific showing that an essential state interest is present is unnecessary
and the showing in Coy was sufficient; 10 1 and finally, the use of the
screen was not prejudicial to Coy's right to a fair trial.'0 2
Justice Blackmun began by asserting that the confrontation
clause's primary purpose is to prevent the use of depositions or ex
parte affidavits in lieu of live testimony and to ensure that the wit-
nesses testify under oath and in the presence of the defendant. 10 3
In addition, the clause ensures that the witnesses are subject to
cross-examination and that the jurors are able to observe the wit-
nesses' demeanors as they testify. 10 4 Justice Blackmun pointed out
that these purposes were fulfilled in Coy and that the screen's only
effect was obstruction of the witness' view of the defendant. 0 5
The dissent clashed 0 6 with the majority over Dean Wigmore's
treatment of the confrontation right. 10 7 The dissent pointed out
that, according to Wigmore, " ' [t]here was never at common law any
97 Id. at 2809-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63
(1980)).
99 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
100 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 2810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 2805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun relied on Kentucky v.
Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987)(citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243
(1895)).
104 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-
43).
105 Id. at 2806 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 A lesser clash between the majority and the dissent began with the dissent's obser-
vation that the face-to-face element of the confrontation right is not essential since blind
witnesses are allowed to testify and they cannot, as the witnesses in Coy, see the defend-
ant. Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority responded that the dissent's
contention is "no more true than that the importance of the right to live, oral cross-
examination is belied by the possibility that speech and hearing-impaired witnesses
might have testified." Id. at 2802 n.2. The dissent then countered that a deaf or mute
witness who could not be cross-examined would also not be able to testify in the first
place. The dissent added that "[m]ore importantly, if a deaf or mute witness were com-
pletely incapable of being cross-examined (as blind witnesses are completely incapable
of seeing a defendant... ), I should think a successful Confrontation Clause challenge
might be brought against whatever direct testimony they did offer." Id. at 2808 n.4
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 2807 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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recognized right to an indispensable thing called confrontation as
distinguished from cross-examination.' "108 The dissent also noted Wig-
more's statement that the purpose of the confrontation right was to
provide for cross-examination and to permit the court to view the
witness' demeanor.10 9 The dissent employed Wigmore's discussion
in arguing that face-to-face confrontation is not an absolute, nor
even a " 'secondary and dispensable' " requirement of the confron-
tation clause. 110
This right, Justice Blackmun asserted, may be departed from "if
it is justified by a sufficiently significant state interest."' Justice
Blackmun stated that the significance of the state's interest in pro-
tecting child witnesses lies not only in shielding the child witness
from further trauma, but also in ensuring effective testimony, which
may be impossible to obtain from an overwhelmed and traumatized
child witness.1 2 Justice Blackmun articulated his view that this state
interest outweighed the "preference" for allowing the witness to see
the defendant during the testimony. 113
Justice Blackmun also stated that a specific showing of necessity
should not be required to justify the use of screens and similar de-
vices.' 14 In support of this, Justice Blackmun noted that other ex-
ceptions to the confrontation clause 15 are generally admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence without any special showing of
necessity. 116 Responding to the majority's assertion that the Iowa
procedure is not "firmly ... rooted in our jurisprudence,"' ' 17 justice
Blackmun stated that a "firm rooting in jurisprudence" was not a
requirement for an exception to the face-to-face confrontation
right. 118 The requirement that an exception be firmly rooted in our
jurisprudence, noted Justice Blackmun, is only imposed in the case
of out-of-court statements, where reliability, not necessity, is ques-
108 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974))(emphasis in original).
109 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, §§ 1397,
1399 at 158, 199)
110 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, § 1399, at
199).
II Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
113 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115 The exceptions to which Justice Blackmun referred included statements of a co-
conspirator, excited utterances, and business records. Id. at 2809 n.6 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
116 Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 2803.
118 Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tioned. 19 Because the testimony at issue was under oath, in view of
the jury, and subject to cross-examination, it was deemed reliable
and no specific showing of reliability or necessity was required.120
Finally, the dissent rejected the defendant's argument that the
screen was prejudicial, a question the majority declined to reach.' 2 1
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the screen was not a brand of
guilt, 122 especially as the jury was instructed to draw no inferences
from the use of the screen. 123 Finally, Justice Blackmun noted that
there are other practices, which single out the accused from all
others in the courtroom, that are permissible. 24
VI. ANALYSIS
Although the majority was inaccurate in stating that face-to-face
confrontation is the most essential requirement of the sixth amend-
ment confrontation right,' 25 the majority and concurring opinions
were correct in holding that the right to face-to-face confrontation is
an important element of the sixth amendment confrontation right.
While the majority declined to comment on the susceptibility of the
confrontation right to exceptions, 26 the concurring opinion was
correct in stating that the right to face-to-face confrontation, like
other elements of the confrontation right, is subject to exceptions
119 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 2810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Previous cases have held that practices such as
clothing the defendant in prison garb or having the defendant shackled and gagged
brand the defendant with a mark of guilt. See Estelle v. Williams', 425 U.S. 501, 505
(1976)(clothing the defendant in prison garb prejudicial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
344 (1970)(having the defendant shackled and gagged prejudicial). Coy argued that the
use of the mirror, which was accompanied by a dimming of the courtroom lights and a
shining of bright lights on the mirror, created a dramatic, eerie effect, and indicated to
thejury that the defendant was guilty. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2810 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
123 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2810 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The trial court instructed the
jury as follows:
It's quite obvious to the jury that there's a screen device in the courtroom. The
General Assembly of Iowa recently passed a law which provides for this sort of pro-
cedure in cases involving children. Now, I would caution you now and I will caution
you later that you are to draw no inference of any kind from the presence of that
screen. You know, in the plainest of language, that is not evidence of the defend-
ant's guilt, and it shouldn't be in your mind as an inference as to any guilt on his
part. It's very important that you do that intellectual thing.
Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting)(quotingJoint Appendix at 17, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798
(1988)(No. 86-6757)) (citation omitted).
124 The dissent cited Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986), in which four uni-
formed state troopers sitting behind the defendant throughout the trial were held not
inherently prejudicial. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 28 10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
126 Id. at 2803.
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relating to essential state interests. 127 The protection of child wit-
nesses from the trauma of facing the defendant, as articulated by
Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion, 128 and the enhance-
ment of the truth-finding process, which the one-way mirror pro-
vides, are policy interests justifying an exception to the
confrontation right. However, as Justice O'Connor stated, the use
of these procedural devices should be allowed only where there has
been a case-by-case showing of necessity. 129 Because there was no
such showing in Coy, the defendant's confrontation right was
violated. 130
A. FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
CONFRONTATION RIGHT
Although support, in the form of factually analagous cases, for a
finding that physical face-to-face confrontation is an element of the
confrontation right is not extensive, support for the opposite con-
clusion is equally sparse. Whether the defendant has a right, guar-
anteed by the sixth amendment, to physically face the witness, thus
was a question of first impression for the Supreme Court. The cases
referred to in the majority opinion concern other aspects of the con-
frontation right, such as the well-established hearsay rules. None of
the cases cited deal with the defendant's right to physically face the
witness.131 Therefore, as the majority conceded, mostjudicial treat-
ment of the confrontation right concerns the right to be present
during testimony and to cross-examine. 132
127 Id. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128 Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131 For example, the leading case, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), involved
prior statements by a witness. In Green, the Court held that the confrontation clause was
not violated when prior statements made by a witness at a preliminary hearing and to a
police officer were admitted to prove the truth of the matter contained therein. Id. at
152-53. A look at the facts of the other cases which the majority used to support the
inclusion of the face-to-face confrontation right in the sixth amendment right reveals
little similarity between these cases and Coy. For example, in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980), the Court held that, when the witness was unavailable, admission of a tran-
script of the witness' testimony at a preliminary hearing did not violate the sixth amend-
ment confrontation right. Id. at 66. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), involved a
witness who testified as to the statements of a co-conspirator. The Court upheld the
admission of this hearsay. Id. at 89-90. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899), held
the admission of prior convictions of defendants violative of the sixth amendment. Id. at
54. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), also a child sexual assault case, differed
substantially from Coy. In Ritchie, the Court held that the confrontation clause was not
violated when the defendant was refused access to a confidential file which he sought for
purposes of cross-examination. Id. at 51-54.
132 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800.
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However, the Court cannot conclude that the right to face-to-
face confrontation is an undeniable element of the right simply be-
cause the Court has never had occasion to address the issue of
whether face-to-face confrontation is required by the sixth amend-
ment. The fact that the right to face-to-face confrontation has not
been the subject of litigation does not mean that it is an undisputed
element of the confrontation right. Judicial opinions concerning
cross-examination and the other confrontation rights are more
prevalent because these are the issues upon which defendants have
commonly appealed their convictions; this does not reflect a belief
of the Court that the right to cross-examination is somehow less es-
sential than the right to face-to-face confrontation.
While a comparison of the facts of the other confrontation
clause cases with those of Coy does not offer much support for inclu-
sion of the face-to-face confrontation right in the sixth amendment
right, an analysis of the language of the confrontation clause cases
does support this principle.133 Moreover, the Supreme Court's past
discussions of the relationship between the hearsay rules and the
confrontation clause lend further support for the majority's holding.
As the Court pointed out in Green, the hearsay rules and the con-
frontation clause are somewhat parallel. 34 In Green, the Court out-
lined the three purposes of the confrontation right, which it held
were fulfilled by the admission of prior statements of a witness pres-
ent at trial and subject to cross-examination. 3 5 The purposes of the
confrontation right, as delineated by the Green court, are that con-
frontation: "1) insures that the witness will give his statements
under oath ... ; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examina-
tion...; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's
fate to observe the demeanor of the witness.., thus aiding the jury
in assessing his credibility."' 13 6
133 For example, in Ritchie, the Court stated that "[t]he Confrontation Clause provides
two types of protection for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who
testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 51
(citation omitted). In Green, Justice Harlan, concurring, stated that the confrontation
clause confers "a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at
trial." Green, 399 U.S. at 175 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court also stressed that the
"literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial" formed "the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause." Id. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895), the Court stated that the confrontation right consists essentially of the defendant
"seeing the witness face to face" and cross-examination. Id. at 244. Moreover, in Kirby,
the Court stated that the defendant must be allowed to see the witness. Kirby, 174 U.S.
at 55.
134 Gfeen, 399 U.S. at 155.
135 Id. at 158-59.
136 Id. at 158.
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Although these purposes of the confrontation right, which are
also the purposes of the hearsay rules, were fulfilled in Coy, the con-
frontation clause guarantees more than just protection against the
admission of hearsay. The dissent was inaccurate when it suggested
that the confrontation clause merely guarantees the enforcement of
the hearsay rules. 137 As the Court stated in Green:
[w]hile it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confron-
tation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is
quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that
the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of
the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law. Our decisions have never established such a congru-
ence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confronta-
tion values even though the statements in issue were admitted under
an arguably recognized hearsay exception.' 38
While the use of the one-way mirror in Coy fulfilled the three
Green requirements, it nevertheless prevented face-to-face confron-
tation between the witnesses and the defendant. The screen com-
pletely obstructed the witnesses' view of the defendant and
somewhat impeded the defendant's view of the witnesses. 139 The
majority's contention that it is harder to lie about a person when
facing that person, while not strongly substantiated, is persuasive.
As pointed out by the Court in Jay v. Boyd, 140 " '[an honest witness
may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at
the man, whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the
facts.' "141 The California Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
observed in Herbert v. Superior Court,142 that "[m]ost believe that in
some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and communica-
137 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138 Green, 399 U.S. at 149, 155-56.
139 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2799. Coy argued that the screening barrier obstructed his view
of the witnesses and their reactions as they testified and thus hindered his assistance of
counsel during examination. Brief for Appellant at 36, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798
(1988)(No. 86-6757). Coy cited the trial court, which stated, after testing the device,
that "[i]t is possible to dimly see a person seated in the witness chair" and later added
that "[y]ou can see the features of the person seated in the witness chair, but it is dark."
Id. at 36 n.44 (quotingJoint Appendix at 10-11, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)(No.
86-6757)). Coy added that defense counsel was also unable to view the witnesses clearly
unless he moved away from the defendant's table, thus restricting Coy's access to coun-
sel during cross-examination. Id. at 36.
140 351 U.S. 345 (1956)(denial of deportation suspension to alien based on confiden-
tial information not disclosed to the alien upheld).
141 Id. at 375-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting)(quoting Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIB-
ERTY 35 (1956)).
142 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981)(confrontation rights of defendant
in child sexual assault case violated when the defendant was seated so he could not see
the complaining witness during her testimony).
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tion are influenced by face-to-face challenge."' 43 These principles
provide an underlying rationale for the Court's inclusion of the face-
to-face right in the confrontation clause. 144
The dissent's argument that the law reflects merely a prefer-
ence for, rather than a requirement of, face-to-face confrontation is
unsupported. The dissent emphasized the Court's statement in Ohio
v. Roberts 145 that the Confrontation Clause embodies "a preference
for face-to-face confrontation at trial.' "146 However, this statement
must be viewed in light of its accompanying footnote quoting Cali-
fornia v. Green.' 47 This footnote quoted Green in affirming the essen-
tial nature of the "literal right to 'confront' the witness." 148
Therefore, although the face-to-face confrontation right is not the
most important element of the sixth amendment right, it is never-
theless a required element.
B. THE RIGHT TO FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION IS NOT ABSOLUTE
The fact that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not the
most essential element of the confrontation clause supports the con-
clusion that the face-to-face confrontation right is subject to excep-
tions, as are other elements of the confrontation right. Although
the majority declined to resolve this issue, the concurring opinion
accurately concluded that there are constitutionally permissible ex-
ceptions to the defendant's right to physically face the witness. 149
The Supreme Court has stated more than once that even the
most well established elements of the confrontation clause, such as
the right to cross-examination, are subject to exceptions.' 50 Prior
recorded testimony of an unavailable witness is an example of such
exceptions. In Roberts, the witness' " 'whereabouts were entirely un-
143 Id. at 670, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 855 (quoting U.S. v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th
Cir. 1979)).
144 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
145 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
146 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2808. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63).
147 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
148 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 n.5 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 157). Roberts quoted the
Court's statement in Green that "it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time
of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause."
Green, 399 U.S. at 157.
149 108 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150 'In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895), the Court stated that consti-
tutional safeguards like the confrontation right "must occasionally give way to consider-
ations of public policy and the necessities of the case." Id. at 243. In Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 294 (1973), the Court stated that, "[o]f course, the right to con-
front ... is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Id. at 295.
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known' "151 and the prosecution sought admission of hearsay con-
sisting of a transcript of the witness' testimony at a preliminary
hearing.' 52 The Court held the transcript admissible as an excep-
tion to the confrontation right. 153
Another constitutionally permissible exception to the confron-
tation right involves prior inconsistent and out-of-court statements
of a testifying witness. In Green, the witness was available and, in
fact, testified at the trial.154 After testifying at trial inconsistently
with his testimony at a preliminary hearing, the witness' "memory
was 'refreshed' by his preliminary hearing testimony," parts of
which were read by the prosecutor. 155 The Court held that the ad-
mission of excerpts from the testifying witness' testimony at a pre-
liminary hearing was not unconstitutional where the witness was
subject to cross-examination at both proceedings. 156
A third example of exceptions to the confrontation right is the
admissibility of a co-conspirator's statements. In Dutton v. Evans,' 57
a witness testified as to statements made to him by a fellow prisoner,
who was a co-conspirator of the defendant.' 58 The statements in-
criminated the defendant. 159 The Court held the statements admis-
sible160 in accordance with a Georgia statute which provided that,
"[a]fter the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by
any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal
project shall be admissible against all."' 16 '
The Coy majority stated that because the face-to-face confronta-
tion right is the most literal element of the sixth amendment right it
should not be subject to exceptions. 162 The Court seemed to be
151 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 61 (quoting State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St. 2d 191, 194, 378
N.E.2d 492, 495 (1978), rev'd, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
152 Id. at 58.
153 Id. at 77. In a similar case, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 410 U.S. 204 (1971), the previous
trial testimony of a witness who had moved to Sweden was held admissible as an excep-
tion to the confrontation right, because the Court found the witness unavailable. Id. at
209, 216.
154 Green, 399 U.S. at 152.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 158.
157 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
158 Id. at 77-78.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 77-78, 89-90.
161 GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954). The co-conspirator exception was also applied in
United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)(admission of the out-of-court statements of a
non-testifying co-conspirator upheld), and Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775
(1987) (admission of the out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator did not violate con-
frontation clause).
162 Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988).
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arranging the confrontation rights on a spectrum, ranging from
least established to most established. However, while the face-to-
face confrontation right may be the most literal element of the sixth
amendment right, it has also been the least litigated and had not,
until Coy been the subject of a ruling by the Court. If the Court's
spectrum rationale is to be applicable in determining the suscepti-
bility of the confrontation right to exceptions, the fact that the face-
to-face confrontation right is the least substantiated element of the
sixth amendment confrontation right leads to the conclusion that
the right at issue in Coy is actually the most susceptible to
exceptions. 163
C. PROTECTIVE MEASURES SERVE A STATE INTEREST JUSTIFYING
EXCEPTIONS TO THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT
An interpretation of the majority opinion as holding that, even
if the right to face-to-face confrontation were subject to exceptions
in the interest of public policy, the protection of child sexual assault
victims is not such a policy would ignore a grave societal problem.
In fact, the majority never actually stated that the protection of child
witnesses is not a public policy sufficiently important to justify ex-
ceptions to the confrontation right. The opinion merely stated that
163 The majority's view that the exceptions to the confrontation clause involving non-
literal rights, such as the right to cross-examine or to exclude out-of-court statements,
are distinguishable from the exception advocated by the state in Coy is flawed in another
respect. The majority held that it is permissible to erode the right to cross-examine and
the right to exclude out-of-court statements, but that the right to physically face the
defendant, as a literal requirement of the clause, is less susceptible to exceptions. Id. at
2803. However, the same hearsay exceptions which infringe on the right to cross-ex-
amine and the right to exclude out-of-court statements also infringe on the literal ele-
ment of the clause-the right to physically face the witness. Justice O'Connor made this
observation in her concurrence in Coy, when she stated:
[i]ndeed, virtually all of our cases approving the use of hearsay evidence have impli-
cated the literal right to "confront" that has always been recognized as forming "the
core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause," and yet have fallen
within an exception to the general requirement of face-to-face confrontation.
Id. at 2804-2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157 (1970)(citations omitted). For example, in Dutton, as well as the other cases involv-
ing the co-conspirator exception, the defendant was denied the opportunity to cross-
examine and to exclude the out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator whose state-
ments to a testifying witness were admitted at the defendant's trial. Dutton, 400 U.S. at
77-78. In this case, the defendant was also denied the opportunity to face the co-con-
spirator whose out-of-court statements were used against him. In Roberts, the defendant
was denied the opportunity to cross-examine at trial he unavailable witness whose pre-
liminary hearing testimony was being admitted. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58-59. The defend-
ant was also denied the opportunity to face the witness at trial. However, in both cases
the Court allowed the exception. Id. at 77. These cases demonstrate that the Court has
permitted the right to physically face the defendant, along with the non-literal elements
of the confrontation clause, to be infringed.
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because the prosecution did not demonstrate that the use of the
screen in Coy was necessary, the existence of an essential state inter-
est was not established. 164 Therefore, the majority left undecided
the issue which the concurring and dissenting opinions decided af-
firmatively: that because the public policy served by protective de-
vices such as the screen in Coy is an essential state interest, the
defendant's right to physically face the witnesses can be violated in
certain cases to protect child victims of sexual assault. 165
The Court has not developed a comprehensive scheme or set of
factors to be used in formulating exceptions to the confrontation
clause. In Roberts, the United States Supreme Court commented,
"[t]he Court has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confronta-
tion Clause that would determine the validity of all' "hearsay excep-
tions. 166 However, an analysis of the public policies that the Court
has determined justify exceptions to the confrontation clause rights
supports a conclusion that the state's interest in protecting child wit-
nesses is such a public policy. The application of constitutional
criminal procedural safeguards must consider balancing the rights
of the individual against the "rights of the public" in preventing "a
manifest failure of justice."'1 6 7 The most prominent public policies
which the Court has stated support the established exceptions to the
confrontation right are the policies of "effective law enforce-
ment" 168 and "accurate factfinding."' 169 Additionally, the Court has
referred to "other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process"
which justify exceptions to the confrontation right. 70
The public policy of protecting child witnesses from the trauma
of courtroom testimony justifies an exception to the confrontation
right to permit the use of a protective device such as that used in
Coy. By increasing the probability that a child victim will be willing
to testify and will testify accurately against the sexual offender, de-
vices such as the Coy screen increase the likelihood that a sexual
abuser will be convicted. The screen in Coy and other procedural
devices designed to shield the child witness therefore represent the
policy of "effective law enforcement"' 7'1 and "accurate fact-find-
ing."' 172 Moreover, the protection of the child witness from the
164 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
165 Id. at 2803 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
167 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243, 244 (1895).
168 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
169 Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782 (1987).
170 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
171 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
172 Bourlaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782.
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trauma of facing the defendant can most certainly be considered as
within the class of "other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process."' 73 Therefore, the use of the screen serves a public policy
which strongly justifies a marginal infringement of the defendant's
confrontation right.
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,174 the Court hinted at its
willingness to permit infringements on constitutional rights for the
purpose of protecting child witnesses.' 75 The Globe Court held that
a Massachusetts statute 176 which mandated the exclusion of the
press and general public, under all circumstances, from the court-
room, during the testimony of a minor victim at a sex offense trial
violated the first amendment. 177 The Globe Court stated that the in-
terest of "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of
a minor" victim testifying regarding a sexual assault was a compel-
ling interest which would justify a violation of the first amendment
right of the press and general public to access to trials under certain
circumstances.' 78 While striking the statute as unconstitutional, the
Court nonetheless supported the exclusion of the press and general
public if the trial court determines "on a case-by-case basis whether
closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim."' 79
The Court's determination in Globe that the interest of protecting
child sexual assault victims from the trauma of testifying was a
"compelling one,"18 0 justifying an infringement of the first amend-
ment when necessary, strongly supports the conclusion that the
same interest justifies an infringement of the sixth amendment con-
frontation right.
Procedural devices designed to ease the trauma to the child vic-
tim of sexual assault are necessary to secure both the testimony of
the victim and the veracity of the testimony, thereby facilitating the
conviction of sexual offenders of children, which furthers the goals
173 Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.
174 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
175 Id. at 607-609.
176 The statute provided:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime
involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with
or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed ... the presiding
justice shall exclude the general public from the court room [sic], admitting only
such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
177 Globe, 457 U.S. at 610-11. The first amendment states in pertinent part:
"[c]ongress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
178 Globe, 457 U.S. at 607-08.
179 Id. at 608.
180 Id. at 607.
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of "effective law enforcement" 18 t and "accurate fact-finding."' 8 2
These goals are particularly important because of the gravity of the
problem of child sexual abuse. In 1985, there were an estimated
113,000 cases of officially reported child sexual abuse.18 3 More-
over, there is evidence that the actual incidence of sexual abuse of
children is much more extensive than the officially reported statis-
tics indicate. 18 4 Studies demonstrate that two-thirds of all sexually
abused children suffer identifiable emotional disturbance and four-
teen percent of all victims become severely disturbed.'8 5 Child sex-
ual abuse has been linked with depression, learning difficulties,
sexual promiscuity, runaway behavior, hysterical seizures, and com-
pulsive rituals, 8 6 although the effects vary from child to child.'8 7
181 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
182 Boujaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782.
183 This figure was compiled by the American Humane Association (AHA), based on
reports from state child-protective agencies. Donnelly, Child Sexual Abuse, 1 CONG.
QUARTERLY'S EDITORIAL RES. REP. 490, 492 (1987).
184 Id. For example, 54%o of 930 San Francisco women surveyed in a random sam-
pling reported experiencing sexual abuse prior to the age of eighteen. A similar study
of 521 Boston men and women revealed that 15% of women and 6%o of men reported
past sexual abuse. Additionally, 12% of women and 3% of men in a survey of 2000
Texans reported sexual abuse as children. Id.
185 Weiss & Berg, Child Victims of Sexual Assault: Impact of Court Procedures, 21 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 513, 514 (1982).
186 J. CONTE, A LOOK AT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 22 (1986). A recent study organized the
impact of child sexual abuse into a model identifying four specific effects of the abuse:
traumatic sexualization, betrayal, powerlessness and stigmatization. Finkelhor &
Browne, The Traumatic Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A Conceptualization, 55 AM. J. ORTHo-
PSYCHIATRY 531-37 (1985). Traumatic sexualization occurs when a child's sexual devel-
opment is misdirected by the abuse in an "interpersonally dysfunctional fashion." Id. at
531. This phenomenon results in "inappropriate repertoires of sexual behavior, ...
misconceptions about [the child's] . .. sexual self-concepts, and ... unusual emotional
associations to sexual activities." Id. Betrayal refers not only to betrayal by offenders
who are trusted family members or friends but also to betrayal by family members who
are unwilling to believe or protect the victim. The disillusionment and hostility resulting
from this betrayal can lead to acquiescence in other abusive relationships, aversions to
all relationships, marital problems, antisocial behavior or delinquency. Powerlessness
arises from the invasion of the child's body against the child's will. The condition is
exacerbated by coercion and manipulation. Powerlessness, particularly for males, leads
to an unusual need to control or dominate others. Stigmatization results from negative
feelings of shame and guilt communicated to the child victim by the offender and soci-
ety. Stigmatization may result in the victim's engaging in alcohol abuse, criminal behav-
ior, or prostitution. Id. at 531-39.
187 Victims of a single incident, such as the victims in Coy, generally experience acute
anxiety, phobic reactions and depression. Weiss & Berg, supra note 185, at 514. Sexu-
ally abused adolescents can become suicide risks and younger children may exhibit re-
gressive phenomena such as bed-wetting, separation concerns and clinging, infantile
behavior. See id. at 514. See also D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE
VICTIM IS A CHILD: ISSUES FORJUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 15-16 (1985)(describing effects
of abuse and factors contributing to variation in child responses). If the offender is
never apprehended, the effects of the abuse are aggravated due to the child's fear of
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The impact of sexual abuse can be long lasting. Many incest victims
experience psychological disturbance even twenty years after the as-
sault. l88 Some child abuse victims grow up to become offenders
themselves. 8 9
Procedural reform in the prosecution of child sexual assault
cases is needed because, despite the gravity of the problem of child
sexual abuse, the offenders are often never convicted due to the so-
cietal, institutional, and procedural barriers which impede the re-
porting, investigating and prosecuting of these crimes.190 As the
Court pointed out in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,' 9 1 "[c]hild abuse is one
of the most difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part
because there often are no witnesses except the victim.' 1 92 Bring-
ing the abuse to the attention of the authorities is the first obstacle
to the successful prosecution of child sexual assault cases. 193 Once
action is taken on a reported incident, difficulties arise in the investi-
gation of the report. Multiple questionings of the child, often by
untrained parties, place a great strain upon the child and are one of
the most traumatic aspects of the process. 194 Questioning by inves-
tigators who treat children as they treat adults and employ leading
questions often prompts children to alter their stories, rendering it
difficult for authorities to ascertain the facts. 195 Because of these
problems, and because child sexual assault cases are traditionally
hard to win, prosecutors are generally reluctant to take on child sex-
repeated incidents or threats of reprisal by the offender. Weiss & Berg, supra note 185,
at 514. Assaults by family members, which, according to some estimates, comprise three
quarters of the cases, Donnelly, supra note 183, at 492, are additionally accompanied by
deep feelings of guilt over the "'trouble'. . . [the child] 'caused' the family." Weiss &
Berg, supra note 185, at 514.
188 Goodman, Child Witnesses: Conclusions and Future Directions for Legal Practice, 40 J.
Soc. ISSUES 157, 167 (1984).
189 j. CoNrE, supra note 186, at 23.
190 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 493-96.
191 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
192 Id. at 60.
193 Many child victims are either too embarassed to speak out or too afraid to speak
out as a result of threats from the offender. D. WHrrCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN,
supra note 187, at 4. Victims of sexual abuse by family members often will not report the
abuse because of loyalty to or fear of hostility and rejection from the offender and the
family. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40J. Soc.
IssuEs 125, 128 (1984). Children who tell their stories to family members or other
trusted figures are often not believed. Id. at 127. Even when children are believed, the
children and their families may be hesitant to report the crime because of fear of the
trauma to the victim which may be inflicted by the criminal justice system. Id. at 128.
Moreover, when the crimes are reported, overburdened child protection agencies, which
are often responsible for initial investigations, are sometimes forced to ignore many
reports. Donnelly, supra note 183, at 494.
194 D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 187, at 100.
195 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 494-96.
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ual abuse cases.1 96 Recently, however, these attitudes have been
changing. 19 7
Once a case is brought to trial, further problems arise. The
credibility of child witnesses may be questioned because of miscon-
ceptions about the competency of child witnesses with regard to
memory deficits, levels of suggestibility, or ability to distinguish be-
tween fact and fantasy. 198 However, several studies have disproved
these misconceptions. 199 Nevertheless, even completely honest chil-
dren can sometimes be ineffective witnesses. 200 Children frequently
have problems providing a coherent narrative of events, often in re-
sponse to the stress of interrogation. 20 These problems are aggra-
vated when, as often is the case, the crime "involves many separate
acts, occurring over a long period of time" and reported only much
later.20 2 "An abused child's inability to provide investigators with
basic details of time, place and physical description often results in
the case being dropped." 20 3
Cases may also be dropped when the adverse effects of police
interrogation, court delays, and, in cases of incest, family pressures,
cause the victim to recant. 20 4 Because the victim is often the only
witness, the victim's testimony is essential to successful prosecution
of the offender. 20 5 For instance, in one case where a twelve-year-old
girl was gang raped by five teenagers, the charges were dropped
against one of the offenders because the victim could not go
through with a second trial. 20 6 In another case in which an eleven-
year-old boy was sodomized by two men, the boy's parents decided
196 Id. at 497.
197 Id.
198 Bulkley, Legal Proceedings, Reforms and Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 6
BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 153, 155 (1988).
199 See id. at 155. Studies reveal that there is little support for the assertion that child
reports of abuse are unreliable. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 193, at 127. Evidence
shows that children do not tend to fantasize about things outside of their realm of nor-
mal experience. Landwirth, Children as Witnesses in Child Sexual Abuse Trials, 80 PEDIATRICS
585, 586 (1987). The evidence also indicates that children are more likely to underre-
port the amount and type of abuse, as opposed to exaggerating such abuse. Berliner &
Barbieri, supra note 193, at 127. Moreover the validity of child reports is supported by
the relatively high rates of confessions by offenders. Id. Another commentator states
that "[flalse allegations by either children or adults [of sexual assault] remain rare
events," which can be avoided by "proper investigatory technique[s]." Quinn, The Cred-
ibility of Children's Allegations of Sexual Abuse, 6 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 181, 195 (1988).
200 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 494.
201 Id. at 494-495.
202 Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 193, at 129.
203 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 495.
204 Weiss & Berg, supra note 185, at 516.
205 Bell, Working with Child Witnesses, PUB. WELFARE 5, 6 (Winter 1988).
206 Weiss & Berg, supra note 185, at 516. One of the offenders was tried separately,
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not to prosecute because they were concerned about the traumatic
effects of a court trial.207 The boy had shown signs of emotional
disturbance following the incident and was beginning to recover
when the parents made the decision not to prosecute.208 In State v.
Sheppard,209 an attorney, who had reviewed between seventy-five and
eighty cases of child abuse as a member of a "charge" committee in
the prosecutor's office, testified that nearly ninety percent of the
child abuse cases were dismissed because children could not cope
with the prospect of facing the defendant, relatives and strangers in
a courtroom. 2 10 The attorney told of one instance in which a case of
sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl was dropped because a psy-
chiatrist advised that "the child could not testify without having a
total emotional breakdown." 211
Because the problems at the pre-trial stages of a sexual assault
case result in so few incidents of sexual assault actually being prose-
cuted, it is especially important that once a case reaches trial, the
child is afforded the protection that will allow him or her to testify
accurately and without undergoing excessive trauma. 212 The gravity
of the child sexual abuse problem and its devastating effects on child
victims necessitates the prosecution of these crimes to deter the of-
fenders and vindicate the victims. 213 Because of the multitude of




209 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
210 Id. at 417, 484 A.2d at 1333.
211 Id. at 418, 484 A.2d at 1333. Another attorney with substantial experience in the
prosecution of child abuse cases testified that out of the thirty or forty cases he had
handled, he was able to complete a trial in only one. Id. at 417, 484 A.2d at 1333.
212 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 494-496, 497. The many problems involved in sexual
assault cases which prevent offenders from being brought to justice comprise an under-
lying rationale for placing special emphasis on convicting sexual offenders against chil-
dren. Sexual abusers of children are most likely undeterred by the criminal penalties of
child sexual assault because of the problems in the prosecution of child sexual abuse
cases. For example, potential offenders are aware that children often do not speak out,
that children's reports of abuse are often not believed, and that children are often too
traumatized by the assault and its aftermath to testify. Because the chances that a sexual
offender against a child will be convicted are relatively small, the potential offender is
not as deterred by the possibility of being caught as perpetrators of other crimes might
be. One who rapes, kidnaps or assaults an adult does not know, as does one who sexu-
ally assaults children, that psychological, societal and institutional barriers will contrib-
ute to preventing him from being brought to justice.
213 The existence of these problems in the criminal justice system seems to lend sup-
port to the arguments of some mental health professionals who advocate the diversion
of child sexual abuse cases from the criminal justice system to juvenile or family court,
or voluntary treatment programs. These experts believe that offenders have psychologi-
cal disorders that call for treatment rather than punishment. Berliner & Barbieri, supra
1988]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
problems which characterize the investigation and prosecution of
these crimes, procedural reforms are needed. 214 Devices such as the
mirror in Coy ease the trauma to the child of facing the defendant
during testimony, thereby encouraging the child witness to testify.
Facilitating the child's testimony is especially important because the
note 193, at 129. See also J. BULKLEY, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: LEGAL ISSUES AND AP-
PROACHES i (1981). Additional controversy over whether child sexual abuse should be
prosecuted where the abuser is a parent is generated by concern over the trauma to the
family. Bulkley, supra note 198, at 154. Other professionals argue that the criminal jus-
tice system provides the "concrete symbol... [which] sanctions the total unacceptability
of such behavior." J. BULKLEY, supra note 213, at i. "Most child sexual abusers know
that they are breaking the law and can be held legally responsible." Berliner & Barbieri,
supra note 193, at 128. In addition, sexual offenders rarely seek mental-health treatment
voluntarily. Id. Often offenders that are in voluntary treatment drop out. J. BULKLEY,
supra note 213, at ii. The criminal court has the coercive power that alternative methods
of addressing the problems of child sexual assault do not have. Bulkley, supra note 198,
at 157. Moreover, there still remains the problem of false accusations, which the crimi-
nal justice system, through its procedural safeguards, is designed to ferret out. Id.
Therefore, the criminal justice system, with its specialized fact finding process and deter-
rent effect, remains the best corrective forum for the problem of child sexual abuse.
Once an offender has been convicted, the law can then "be used effectively as a leverage,
even when the goal of all concerned is treatment rather than punishment." Berliner &
Barbieri, supra note 193, at 128.
214 Other reforms of courtroom procedure implemented in some jurisdictions include
provisions to: 1) liberalize the competency requirements of minor witnesses; 2) require
speedy trials of sexual assault cases; 3) establish special hearsay exceptions for the child
victim's out-of-court statement of abuse; 4) close the courtroom to the press or public
during the child's testimony; and 5) permit greater use of expert testimony. Brief of
Amicus Curiae The American Bar Association at 12, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798
(1988)(No. 86-6757). In addition, early docketing of cases involving child vic-
tims/witnesses addresses the problems of delays in prosecution of child sexual assault
cases. Goodman, Jones, Pyle, Prado-Estrada, Port, England, Mason & Rudy, The Emo-
tional Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on Child Sexual Assault Victims: A Preliminary Report,
in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHILD WITNESSES: Do THE
COURTS ABUSE CHILDREN? (in press) [hereinafter Goodman]. To address problems at
the investigative stages, states have passed reporting laws, which "establish a compre-
hensive legislative scheme for child protection designed to encourage reports of abuse
.... to designate one agency to handle reports, and to offer services to children and
families." Bulkley, supra note 198, at 158. Some communities have established pro-
grams which address the problems arising in child sexual assault cases before and dur-
ing the prosecution of the cases. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, INNOVATIONS IN THE
PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES (1981) (providing descriptions of several
county and municipal programs for handling child sexual abuse cases). For example, in
Seattle, a program called the Sexual Assault Center contributed to the implementation
of new approaches to handling child sexual abuse cases. A special children's interview-
ing room instead of the police station, and joint interviews to avoid multiple interroga-
tions were introduced. In addition, sensitive questioning techniques designed to reduce
trauma to the child and enhance information gathering represent another area of possi-
ble reform. J. BULKLEY, supra note 213, at 13. A guardian ad litem, or legal representa-
tive, can work with the prosecutor to represent the child's interests and ensure that the
child is handled sensitively. Id. at 14.
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child victim is often the only witness to the crime. 215 Against this
background, it is clear that the public policy of prosecuting crimes
of sexual assault on children justifies a marginal infringement upon
the defendant's right of confrontation.
In addition to the public policy of bringing sexual offenders to
justice, the Coy screen and other similar devices serve the interest of
protecting the child victim from the further trauma of testifying
under the stare of the defendant, which is certainly one of the other
"legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. '216 The line sepa-
rating the adverse effects upon the child resulting from the actual
abuse and the adverse effects upon the child resulting from involv-
ment in the legal process is difficult to demarcate. However, evi-
dence suggests that involvement in court proceedings intensifies the
trauma to child sexual assault victims. 217 A recent study of child
sexual assault victims involved in criminal proceedings demon-
strated that children who testified in court showed a larger increase
in overall behavioral disturbance than those children who did not
testify in court.218 The fear of facing the defendant is only one of
the factors that contributes to the traumatic effect of courtroom tes-
timony, 21 9 heightening the "emotional fallout of the legal pro-
cess." '220 However, one study found that the most frequently
mentioned fear of child victims of sexual assault was facing the de-
fendant.221 "[T]o a child who does not understand the reason for
confrontation, the anticipation and experience of being in close
proximity to the defendant can be overwhelming." 222 If a child is
attempting to recover from the traumatic effects of sexual abuse,
seeing the offender in the courtroom "may reactivate or intensify
the clinical symptoms seen at onset or may produce new ones.1 223
215 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
216 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
217 D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 187, at 17. One commenta-
tor stated: "[f]or a child, testifying in court may be the most traumatic experience of her
involvment in the legal process." J. BULKLEY, supra note 213, at 13.
218 Goodman, supra note 214. Empirical research regarding children's reactions to
court involvement is in its early stages. Id.
219 D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 187, at 17-18.
220 Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A Psychological Dilemma, 40 J. Soc.
ISSUES 109, 109 (1984).
221 D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLVAGEN, supra note 187, at 17. A recent study
focused on the effects of court testimony on child sexual assault victims. Although not
all children expressed negative feelings about other aspects of courtroom testimony
such as talking to the judge or talking to the defense attorney, a significantly larger
number of children expressed negative feelings about seeing the accused in court.
Goodman, supra note 214.
222 D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 187, at 17-18.
223 Weiss & Berg, supra note 185, at 516.
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Moreover, after going through the trauma of testifying, a child vic-
tim can be especially devastated by an acquittal for the defendant.
Children often do not understand why the process has not resulted
in a just outcome. 224
The introduction of protective devices in cases of child sexual
assault will not set a precedent for infringing on the defendant's
sixth amendment confrontation right in cases involving adults. The
particular need for using protective devices with child witnesses
stems from the fact that child victims are inherently different from
adult victims. A child does not understand why he or she must re-
peat his or her story to police, social workers, doctors, prosecutors,
and the court and this further aggravates the child's feelings of help-
lessness. 225 Children are particularly affected by cross-examination,
which they also do not understand. 226 Moreover, child victims who
testify are overwhelmed by certain physical attributes of the court-
room or the figure of the judge.227 Some children also may experi-
ence anxiety when they are asked questions which cause them to
fear they have done something wrong.228
In addition, the rationale underlying the need for face-to-face
confrontation does not apply to children in the same way that it ap-
plies to adults. The majority contends that the "Confrontation
Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon
the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of
fact will draw its own conclusions." 229 This represents a choice for
the child between looking at the defendant and experiencing the re-
sulting trauma, and trying not to look at the defendant, thereby in-
creasing the jury bias against the child's credibility. A truthful child
who is terrified in the presence of the defendant will of course avoid
looking at the defendant, thereby decreasing his or her chances of
being believed. On the other hand, the use of protective proce-
dures for child witnesses may enhance truth telling. In State v. Shep-
pard,230 a forensic psychiatrist explained this while testifying for the
224 Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 193, at 135.
225 D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 187, at 18.
226 Id. Even an adult victim who thoroughly comprehends the importance of careful
investigation and procedural safeguards in the criminal justice system would feel frustra-
tion, pain, and helplessness at the delays and complexities of the system. Children, on
the other hand, do not understand why they have to be questioned so many times, why
they have to reveal and relive the painful details of their experience to strangers, why the
legal process takes so long, and, in some cases, why their attacker has not been pun-
ished. Id. at 17-18.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 19.
229 Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988).
230 197 NJ. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
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state at a hearing in response to the state's application to employ
closed-circuit television during the testimony of the child sexual as-
sault victim. The psychiatrist stated that while an adult witness will
be prompted by the traditional court setting to tell the truth, the
"opposite is true of a child, particularly when the setting involves a
relative." 231 In addition to the fear, anxiety and trauma caused by
the courtroom, the child also has mixed feelings about his or her
testimony. For the accused, he or she feels anger as well as care.
The child feels guilt as well as satisfaction in response to the pros-
pect of convicting the defendant.23 2 "These mixed feelings '. . miti-
gate the truth, producing inaccurate testimony." 233 On the other
hand, the more relaxed atmosphere provided by devices such as the
mirror may result in the child giving a clearer and more complete
description of the abuse. 23 4
Although there are other possible reforms which address the
problems of child witnesses, many of these other procedural re-
forms pose the same type of constitutional questions raised by the
screen in Coy. Videotaped testimony, closed-circuit television, and
the admission of prior statements by the child concerning the abuse
all attempt to protect the child. Iowa is, in fact, unusual in permit-
ting the use of the one-way mirror.23 5 The screen used in Coy is
actually the least intrusive of these methods. Closed-circuit televi-
sion does not allow the defendant to be present with counsel during
the child's testimony and cross-examination without forcing the wit-
ness to testify under the defendant's stare. It thus presents a choice
between having the defendant in the same room as the witness or
having only defendant's counsel present with the witness. However,
placing the defendant in a separate room from the witness in this
manner also separates the defendant from his counsel during cross-
examination. 23 6
Devices such as the one-way mirror in Coy serve the essential
state interests of prosecuting sexual offenders of children and pro-
tecting the child victim of sexual assault from the trauma of viewing
231 Id. at 416, 484 A.2d at 1332.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 499.
235 Twenty-five states permit a loosening of the hearsay ban when a child has dis-
closed sexual abuse to a trusted adult and the prosecutor wishes the adult to testify as to
the hearsay. Thirty-four states permit videotaped testimony of a child in lieu of live
testimony. In addition, twenty-five states allow closed-circuit television testimony. Don-
nelly, supra note 183, at 496; Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-408 (1987).
236 An additional advantage to the one-way mirror is that it is less costly and simpler
to implement. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE FAIR TREATMENT OF
CHILD WrrNESSES IN CASES WHERE CHILD ABUSE IS ALLEGED 25 (Approved Draft, 1985).
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the defendant during testimony. Because these interests justify in-
fringing the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation, the use
of these devices constitutes a constitutionally permissible exception
to the confrontation right.
D. A SHOWING OF NECESSITY AS A PREREQUISITE
While protective devices should be allowed as exceptions to the
confrontation right, a showing of necessity should be required for
their use. This view is in accord with the majority and concurring
opinions,23 7 and with several state legislatures which have incorpo-
rated the requirement of necessity into their states' protective pro-
cedure statutes.238 In Ohio v. Roberts,239 the Court outlined an
approach for permitting exceptions to the confrontation right.2 4 0
The Court stated that "in conformance with the Framers' prefer-
ence for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a
rule of necessity." 241 The Roberts Court explained that if the prose-
cution wishes to introduce hearsay, it must be demonstrated that the
declarant is unavailable and that the statement is reliable.242 More-
over, in Chambers v. Mississippi,243 the Court emphasized that the
"denial" or "diminution" of the right to confront by competing in-
terests "requires that the competing interest be closely ex-
amined." 244 The Chambers rule suggests that if an exception to the
237 See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803 (1988); id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
238 For example, Florida provides for the use of closed-circuit television in sexual as-
sault cases involving children under age sixteen "[u]pon motion and hearing in camera
and upon a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer at least
moderate emotional or mental harm if required to testify." FIA. STAT. § 92.54(1)
(1987). Massachusetts requires that a court ordering the use of a protective procedure
must find "by a preponderance of the evidence at the time of the order that the child
witness is likely to suffer psychological or emotional trauma as a result of testifying."
MASS GEN. L. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(1) (1986). NewJersey requires that there be a "substan-
tial likelihood" of "severe emotional or mental distress" for the use of closed-circuit
testimony to be permitted. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West Supp. 1988). Cali-
fornia provides extensive guidelines for making a finding of necessity, delineating the
factors to be considered. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(1) (West Supp. 1988). States that
do not require a finding of necessity before the use of protective devices include Con-
necticut, Kansas, Kentucky, and Louisiana. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (Supp.
1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-350(1)(3) (Baldwin
1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1987).
239 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
240 Id. at 64-65.
241 Id. at 65.
242 Id.
243 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
244 Id. at 295 (citing Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)).
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confrontation right is being invoked, a particularized showing justi-
fying the exception must be made.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 245 also supports the require-
ment of a showing of necessity in the context of protecting child
witnesses. 246 The Globe Court held the Massachusetts statute uncon-
stitutional because the statute mandated exclusion in all cases.2 47
The Court stated that "as compelling as that interest [of protecting
minor victims of sexual assault] is, it does not justify a mandatory clo-
sure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case
may affect the significance of the interest." 248 The Court stated that
a trial court should determine whether exclusion is necessary based
on such factors as the victim's age, the victim's psychological matur-
ity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the victim's wishes,
and the interests of parents and relatives. 249
The Court pointed out that the particular circumstances in
Globe may have led to a finding that closure was unnecessary, had the
trial court not been limited by the statute's provision of mandatory
exclusion. 250 The Court noted that the names of the victims in Globe
were already publicly known, and that, according to the prosecuting
attorney, the victims stated that they wouldn't object to the press
being present during their testimony provided that the press would
not interview them or publish their names, photographs or personal
information. 25' The Court added that child victims "could be pro-
tected just as well by requiring the trial court to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the
well-being of the minor victim necessitates closure" as by requiring
mandatory closure in all cases. 25 2 The Court discussed the rationale
for a finding of necessity by explaining that "[s]uch an approach en-
sures that the constitutional right of the press and public to gain
access to criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary
to protect the State's interest." 253
Similarly, in allowing an exception to the confrontation right
for cases of child sexual assault, courts must be careful to ensure
that case-specific inquiries are made into the necessity of a protec-
245 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
246 Id. at 609.
247 Id. at 608, 610-611.
248 Id. at 607-608 (emphasis in original).
249 Id. at 608.
250 Id. at 609
251 Id. at 599 n.5.




tive device. 254 A case-specific finding is especially justified in the
context of child protective exceptions because of variation among
victims in reacting to both the sexual assault and the involvement in
the judicial process. There is evidence that some children "appear
unharmed by the criminal justice system." 255 One study concluded
that "the opportunity to testify in juvenile court may exert a protec-
tive effect on the child victim." 2 56 This study suggested that testi-
mony may be therapeutic for the child victim because it gives the
child an opportunity to express his or her feelings and experiences
and to counteract his or her sense of powerlessness. 257 However
the therapeutic effect of the testimony may vary from child to
child,258 just as most studies have shown that some sexually abused
children have far more serious reactions to the abuse than others.259
One commentator stated:
[p]sychiatric opinions and studies emphasize that each child victim re-
acts to an offense and its aftermath in his own individual way....
Thus, there can be no more justification for excusing all child victims
from testifying than for imposing the duty on all of them. Each case
merits its own individual decision. 260
254 As the Court suggested in Globe, Courts can consider several factors in determin-
ing whether the use of a protective procedure is necessary. Id. at 608. The child's age,
fear of the defendant, handicap or disability, reaction to previous interviews, past history
of abuse, and relationship to the defendant are important factors. Brief of Amicus Cu-
riae The American Bar Association at 16, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)(No. 86-
6757). However, care is warranted in ensuring that an inquiry into the necessity of a
protective device does not subject the child to further trauma. For example, "it would be
self-defeating to subject the child to a grueling voir dire examination or, after the child has
been called to testify, to delay the proceedings while this issue is being resolved." Id. at
17 (emphasis in original). Even a psychiatric evaluation of the child to determine the
need for protective procedures is unnecessary as this determination can be made by
referring to parents and other relatives, a child-victim advocate, a social worker, or the
child's therapist. Id. at 18.
255 D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO, L. STELLWAGEN, supra note 187, at 15-18.
256 Runyan, Everson, Edelsohn, Hunter, & Coulter, Impact of Legal Intervention on Sexu-
ally Abused Children, 113 J. PEDIATRICs 647, 652 (1988)(studying impact on child sexual
abuse victims of foster care placement of victims, criminal prosecution of the offender,
and testimony by the victims in either criminal or juvenile court). The authors cautioned
against applying these results to criminal court testimony. Id.
257 Id. at 652. See also Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 193, at 135 ("the experience of
testifying in court can have a therapeutic effect for the child victim").
258 Runyan, Everson, Edelsohn, Hunter, & Coulter, supra note 256, at 650.
259 J. CONTE, supra note 186, at 22-23. Some of the factors that affect the impact of the
abuse on the child are: the age of the child; the age and gender of the offender; whether
physical force was used; the frequency, severity and duration of the abuse; the relation-
ship of the offender to the child; the number of the offenders; the number of problems
exhibited by the child's family; and the relationship of the child to his or her siblings. Id.
260 Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System,
15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1009 (1969) (citations omitted). Careful attention to the underly-
ing factors thought to aggravate the impact of child abuse is necessitated by the fact that
psychological problems resulting from child sexual abuse often may not be immediately
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Caution in permitting the use of these devices is further war-
ranted by the fact that the danger of convicting innocent defendants
of sexual abuse is not remote. There is evidence that children are
sometimes manipulated by adults who encourage them to make
false accusations of sexual assault.261 For example, a mother in-
volved in a custody dispute with the father may prompt the child to
make false accusations of abuse.262 Due to most children's level of
suggestibility and desire to please adults, leading questions by inter-
rogators may encourage a child to describe things that never hap-
pened.263 Critics of procedural devices aimed at protecting child
witnesses express concerns that these devices set precedents which
may further erode constitutional protections for the accused.264
The possibility of false accusations of sexual assault heightens the
importance of procedural safeguards in cases of sexual assault.
While the protection of child witnesses is an important goal, the
rights of the accused must be protected as well. A rule of necessity
which permits an infringement of a defendant's constitutional right
only when necessary to protect the child witness, increases the pro-
tection of the accused's rights.
The Coy dissent, however, in light of its opinion that the con-
frontation right is not violated by protective devices, disagreed, and
advocated that protective devices should be used even without a
particularized showing of necessity. 265 The dissent pointed to other
exceptions to the confrontation clause which do not require a show-
ing of necessity. 26 6 For example, in United States v. Inadi,26 7 the
apparent. Problems may not show up until later in the victim's life. J. CONrE, supra note
186, at 23. Therefore, a finding of a lack ofnecessity based on the child's appearance at
the time of trial may not be appropriate.
261 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 496. One study found that forty-five percent of re-
ports of sexual abuse are unsubstantiated, although that number may include truthful
reports which were unprovable. A more detailed survey in Denver reached a finding of
only 8% untruthful allegations. Id. at 494. In one case, a man in the process of getting a
divorce was accused of sexually abusing his two young daughters. Although the man
was acquitted, he was still being denied the opportunity to see his children two years
later. Id. at 49 1. Another man was accused of molestation by a friend of his daughter.
Although the jury decided that the incident as described by the girl was physically im-
possible and acquitted the defendant, the financial and personal costs to him were sub-
stantial. Id. at 494. A group of parents who claim to have been falsely accused of sexual
and other abuse have joined in an organization called Victims of Child Abuse Laws, Inc.
(VOCAL). Id. at 493.
262 Id. at 496. One study found that child abuse charges are made in three percent of
custody disputes. Id.
263 Donnelly, supra note 183, at 496.
264 Id. at 493.
265 Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2809 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 2809 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that "statements of
a co-conspirator, excited utterances, and business records are all generally admissible
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Court held that a specific showing that the witness was unavailable
was not required,268 and in Bourjaily v. United States,269 the Court
held that an independent showing of the reliability of evidence vio-
lative of the sixth amendment was also not required. 270 The
Bourjaily Court's reasoning was based on the Court's statement in
Roberts that in the case of a " 'firmly rooted hearsay exception,' " an
independent inquiry into reliability is not necessary. 271 However,
the Roberts decision also stated that "[i]n other cases, the evidence
must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness.- 272 Moreover, the requirement of a
showing of unavailability was not rescinded by Inadi, rather, it was
deemed applicable to prior testimony and not to co-conspirator
statements. 273 Therefore, Inadi and Bourjaily affirmed that a particu-
larized showing of necessity is required, except in the case of a
firmly rooted exception to the confrontation right. In those cases of
exceptions not firmly rooted, "case-specific inquiry into the applica-
bility of the rationale supporting the rule that allows" 274 the excep-
tion is necessary.
The shocking nature of child sexual assault cases leads to emo-
tional demands for reform. However, because of the complex na-
ture of the problem and the danger of infringing on the rights of the
innocent, care is required in the implementation of these reforms.
The inclusion of a rule of necessity as an exception to the confronta-
tion right in child sexual assault cases constitutes this type of care.
under the Federal Rules of Evidence without case-specific inquiry into the applicability
of the rationale supporting the rule that allows their admission." Id. at 2809 n.6 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). However, these examples are much more clearly definable excep-
tions than the one at issue in Coy. For example, the business record exception, FED. R.
EVID. 803(6), is a clearly-defined category to which the rationale underlying the excep-
tion would apply in every case fitting within the category. The category of child sexual
assault victims who would be excessively traumatized by testifying in the presence of
their attackers is a much more ambiguous category, since not all child sexual assault
victims are excessively traumatized by testifying. See supra notes 255-257 and accompa-
nying text. Therefore, the rationale underlying the exception would not apply to every
child victim.
267 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
268 Id. at 394.
269 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
270 Id. at 2782.
271 Id. at 2782-2783 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
272 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
273 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394-95, 400.
274 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2809 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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E. THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF NECESSITY IN COY
As the majority275 and concurrence 27 6 stated, there was no
showing of necessity in Coy to justify the use of the one-way mirror.
The defendant pointed out that there was "no testimony or finding
that the child witnesses were traumatized or would be harmed by
testifying in ... [the defendant's] presence." 27 7 "Neither girl ex-
pressed a preference for the use of the screen during her testi-
mony." 278 The record was "silent as to any justification for
infringement on appellant's right to confront adverse witnesses." 279
The defendant further argued that:
[w]hile the trial judge allowed defense counsel to assert his constitu-
tional objections to the screening barrier, the court provided no expla-
nation for his ultimate ruling. He did not make specific findings of fact
as to the need for a screening device at this trial, nor did he conduct an
evidentiary hearing during which the child witnesses, their parents and
relatives, or expert witnesses could provide some justification for the
extraordinary courtroom structure. 280
The defendant noted that neither witness identified him as the of-
fender and that the testimony of both witnesses was clear and articu-
late.28' Because there was no showing that the witnesses in Coy
would have been traumatized by testifying while the defendant was
within view, the use of the mirror was unnecessary.282 The Court in
Coy was correct in concluding that the defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him was violated.
CONCLUSION
Although the defendant's right to confront the witnesses
against him face-to-face has never been the subject of a Supreme
Court decision, the literal meaning of the confrontation clause and
Supreme Court language in several cases establish that the right is,
if not the most essential, at least an important element of the sixth
amendment confrontation clause. Therefore, Coy's sixth amend-
ment right was violated by the use of the one-way mirror. However,
the right to a face-to-face encounter is, like the other confrontation
rights, not absolute where substantial public policy interests justify
exceptions. The twin goals of convicting sexual offenders against
275 See id. at 2803.
276 Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
277 Brief for Appellant at 39, Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)(No. 86-6757).
278 Id. at 5.
279 Id. at 39-40.
280 Id. at 27.
281 Id. at 28.
282 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
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children and protecting child victims of sexual assault from exces-
sive trauma are public policy interests which justify permitting the
use of protective devices such as the screen in Coy. However, the
use of such a device should only be permitted if a case-specific show-
ing that the device is necessary is made. Because there was no such
showing in Coy, the violation of the defendant Coy's confrontation
right was unconstitutional.
The majority opinion in Coy leaves two questions unanswered:
first, whether, if there were a showing of necessity, the right to phys-
ically face the witness would be subject to an exception for the pur-
pose of protecting child witnesses; second, whether, if a protective
procedure passed the sixth amendment test, the Court would hold it
violative of due process as a prejudicial device.
With regard to the first issue, the decisions in Coy suggest that
Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Rehnquist would join Justices
O'Connor and White to affirm a conviction in which a protective
device was used on a showing of necessity. In such a case the hold-
ing would be determined by Justice Kennedy's vote.283 As to the
issue of prejudice, only Justice Blackmun addressed the issue. How-
ever, because Justices O'Connor and White stated that protective
devices would be allowed on a showing of necessity, it appears that,
according to this reasoning, the prejudicial question is not an obsta-
cle to the constitutionality of protective devices. Therefore, the out-
come of this issue hinges on the same factor as that determining the
first issue.
In any case, Coy does not forbid the use of protective proce-
dures in child sexual assault cases. In her concurring opinion, Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that "[w]hile I agree with the Court that the
Confrontation Clause was violated in this case, I wish to make clear
that nothing in today's decision necessarily dooms such efforts by
state legislatures to protect child witnesses. '284 A conservative ap-
proach toward allowing procedural reforms which implicate consti-
tutional rights should result in reforms of the entire system,
including trial procedure, to protect child victims and to make the
successful prosecution, deterrence and rehabilitation of the offend-
ers more likely.
RACHEL I. WOLLITZER
283 Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision in Coy.
284 Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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